Introduction
China's economic development over the past 30 years has been phenomenal, nearly maintaining a ten percent annual growth rate since 1980. 1 As part of its modernization effort, China has rapidly expanded its space capabilities.
The Chinese publicly claim that their objective in space remains peaceful; however they have developed a counter-space capability that includes a direct-ascent, anti-satellite (ASAT) missile capability that was successfully tested against a Chinese satellite in 2007. This counter-space capability indicates that China's space intent is not peaceful but consistent with space control or high-ground (domination) doctrine. Because space is a critical enabler of virtually every aspect of U.S. economic, social, diplomatic and military activity, the loss of access or the freedom of access to space would threaten the very stability of the United States. China's space program is a developing threat to U.S. national security because it has already proven a capability to deny, degrade, or even destroy space systems if China deemed it necessary to protect or advance its own national interests.
This paper will first review U.S. space policy and strategy to understand what U.S.
strategic principles and objectives for space will be threatened. Following this, the paper will describe both U.S. and Chinese prevailing perspectives on space doctrines for which the PRC is striving. In addition, international thoughts on this issue from Russia, India and Japan will be presented. These three countries are regional rivals with China and have national interests that might be at risk by a Chinese military space program. Next, the paper will present an analysis of what space doctrine the Chinese are pursuing, whether one of space sanctuary, survivability, control, and/or high-ground (dominance). Finally, the paper addresses what the United States must do in order to protect its national interests against a non-peaceful Chinese space program.
United States Space Policy and Strategy
The National Space Policy of the United States of America, dated 28 June 2010, identifies five space principles. The following are the first and fifth principles, the ones that could be affected by a Chinese threat:
The United States considers the sustainability, stability, and free access to, and the use of, space vital to its national interests. Space operations should be conducted in ways that emphasize openness, and transparency to improve public awareness of the activities of government, and enable others to share in the benefits provided by the use of space.
The U.S will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them. 4 The U.S. space policy was undoubtedly written with keen awareness of the growing Chinese space power. In the policy's first principle, the United States calls for nations to possess "transparency" in order to raise awareness of their space programs knowing that China has traditionally been non-transparent with its national security issues. Based on the "congested, contested, and competitive" nature of space, the National Security Space Strategy contains three objectives -"Strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; Maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United
States by space; and Energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security." 11 It is the second objective, which corresponds to the "contested" space environment issue, to maintain and protect its "national security advantages" allowed by space that could be threatened by a Chinese counter-space program.
Chinese Space Intent: A U.S. Perspective U.S. scholars and leaders tend to see the rise of Chinese military power as a threat to U.S.
national security interests. They ascribe to a realist portrayal of China's intent and see a growing power that will naturally assert its will against the current global and Asian regional hegemonthe United States. Therefore, the views they espouse see China's space program being one of space-high ground or space control.
There are four doctrinal schools of thought on the goal of a nation's space program:
space sanctuary, space survivability, space control, space high-ground or a combination of them.
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Space sanctuary calls for the non-weaponization and peaceful use of space. However, it allows for the "militarization" space, that is, space may be used to enable terrestrial military operations by using space-based capabilities like satellite communications and precision navigation. Therefore, space weapons are not part of a space sanctuary doctrine.
Despite China's public statements advocating for a peaceful utilization of space and a negotiation for an international treaty on the peaceful use of outer space, Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that the Chinese are not pursuing a space sanctuary policy. He states that it is not logical for them to do so. "For China to give up its emerging counter-space capabilities, whether through unilateral abnegation or a negotiated arrangement, would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power." 13 The point is valid since the major impetus for China's space modernization effort was derived from the lessons observed in U.S. application of force since Operation Desert
Storm. Reinforcing China's decision to weaponize space to counter the U.S. space capability is
Chinese distrust of the United States' intentions, one of which they believe is the U.S. effort to contain a rising China. As China's military power grows it will not accept U.S. hegemony in Asia and will counter it. "Tensions are not going to subside especially when China is so determined to build increasingly sophisticated weapons systems to counter the U.S. in particular." 14 Space survivability recognizes that space systems, though effective force multipliers and enablers, are less survivable than terrestrial forces and should not be exclusively relied on in war.
Adhering to this line of thought, nations would seek to protect their space assets and produce redundant capabilities within their space programs. Foreign countries' space survivability efforts alone are not a major threat to U.S. national security interests; however, when coupled with offensive counter-space capabilities, such efforts would protect hostile countries' space assets from U.S. retaliation. China is expanding its space capabilities, inherently building redundancy in its programs. Recent accomplishments include the "expansion of the indigenous Chinese military force are relatively vulnerable to hostile attack using kinetic and non-kinetic means.
Therefore, the Chinese see U.S. reliance on space assets as its "Achilles heel."
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Space high-ground (dominance) presents the view that space forces will dominate all warfare. Space weapons will provide the ability to strike adversaries globally at will, making the weaponization of space a requirement in order to destroy the enemy. Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation advocates the Chinese are pursuing this course with their space weapons.
"For the PRC, the ability to secure space dominance and to deny it to an opponent will likely become an increasingly important part of their national security planning." 19 As China continues to grow economically, its demand for natural resources has increased in order to maintain its growth. The need for resources, especially oil and natural gas, has forced China to expand its energy imports from countries in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin
America and South America. 20 Therefore, China's national interests have clearly expanded beyond its borders; according to Cheng, the Chinese will naturally increase their military capabilities to protect their expanded worldwide interests. In order to accomplish this, "the PLA must be able to exploit space at times and places of its own choosing and, equally important, be able to deny an opponent the same freedom of action." China's growing regional and global stature but instead look to China to help grow global prosperity and stability. "China's peaceful rise will further open its economy so that its population can serve as a growing market for the rest of the world, thus providing increased opportunities for --rather than posing a threat to --the international community."
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Chinese journalist Zhong Sheng claims that the United States is over-reacting to a potential threat of a more powerful China. He claims that China's rise is also peaceful due to the Chinese nature and that "China has long been committed to contributing to the well-being of the mankind." 23 Zhong indicates that the U.S. perception that China is a threat is dangerous and may indeed lead to the Chinese and Americans seeing themselves as enemies. He states, "Instead of being worried about China's rising power, foreign countries should pay attention to how China uses its power. It would be unwise to regard the Tiangong-1 (China's space lab) as a space threat because China's peaceful development strategy determines that it stands against the weaponization or any arms race in outer space."
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The PLA leadership also portrays their growth as peaceful despite the PLA doctrine that Wortzel found to be indicative of an offensive-minded space program. "Xu Qiliang, a member of the Central Military Commission and commander of the Air Force, indicated that China's policy towards outer space had always been consistent, it supported that outer space should be used completely for peace purposes, it opposed carrying out an arms race or weaponization in outer space, and China also followed the principle of peace, development, cooperation and peaceful exploration and utilization." 25 The Chinese claim they are producing space weapons for defensive purposes in reaction to U.S. space capabilities that can threaten Chinese security interests. They are striving for a balance with U.S. power in space and are seeking a capability robust enough to serve as deterrence to possible U.S. aggression. If deterrence fails, the Chinese military doctrine of "Active Defense" calls for the use of space weapons to help in defending China. The doctrine calls for a peaceful and defensive military posture until attacked.
While China claims its space program to be peaceful and non-threatening, there are regional neighbors that feel differently.
Chinese Space Intent: A Regional Perspective
Russia sees China's growth in space as inevitable due to its growing power in Asia. Indian military officer realistically summed up that "with time we will get sucked into a military race to protect our space assets, and inevitably there will be a military contest in space." 34 These three regional countries are in agreement with the United States that the Chinese space program is not benign but a threat to their security interests. What space doctrine is China assessed to be adopting that warrants such a judgment?
Assessment: Chinese Space Control for Regional Conflicts
China is adhering to space control doctrine, augmented by space survivability efforts, in order to protect its ability to use space assets while denying the enemy access to and use of space. China is pursuing a weaponization of space as seen by its development of ASAT weapons. The Chinese, using a ballistic missile, kinetically destroyed an aging Chinese satellite in a January 2007 ASAT test. Additionally, they conducted a mid-course ballistic missile intercept test in January 2010 and, according to the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, have illuminated U.S. satellites with ground-based lasers. 35 These lasers are designed to blind, temporarily or permanently, optics on U.S. remote sensing satellites. Even though the Chinese claim that any counter-space efforts are purely defensive in nature, the fact remains that China has produced a space weapons capability and has used it.
The PLA is pragmatic and realizes its capabilities are limited when compared to U.S.
capabilities, and therefore would not attempt to engage the United States in a global space high-ground effort. The Chinese military, although growing rapidly, is still decades behind in reaching parity with the U.S. military. However, the Chinese do believe that they can conduct space control operations in a limited, local conflict such as Taiwan. "Given U.S. military advantages, China's best chance of success in a conflict over Taiwan would be to delay the arrival of U.S. forces until after it forced Taiwan to capitulate, presenting Washington with a fait accompli." 36 Accordingly, China has a strong national security reason to achieve a space control capability - Taiwan In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. maintain the security of Taiwan. Granted, the argument that war is remote due to the economic interdependency of China, Taiwan, and the United States and that a war would be too costly is sound. However, it only tempers the potential for war, not eliminating it.
There are no absolutes when it comes to assessing human behavior in contingencies.
Taiwan is a highly emotional issue for the Chinese who will not accept a declaration of independence by Taiwan, an issue that historically arises consistently during recurring Taiwan elections from conservative Taiwanese politicians. Such rhetoric will keep the Chinese on edge.
The United States wants to avoid a war with China but cannot guarantee that a future Taiwanese leader would not declare independence. As far as achieving space high-ground, although the PLA would like to achieve this over the United States, it is highly unlikely that they will provide the resources necessary to do so by the Chinese Communist Party in the near term. The resources necessary to overtake the U.S.
military and space capability would be extremely costly. China's growing military capabilities still "pale in comparison with U.S. military forces -which possess sophisticated weapons platforms such as the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier." 40 Moreover, with China's ability to influence countries using Chinese economic clout, military and corresponding space dominance is not a necessity. A space control capability will suffice to regionally counter a U.S.
military threat.
What the United States Should Do
The United States, at a minimum, should undertake four strategies to mitigate the Chinese space control capability -engage in diplomatic talks with China and also with regional Last, the U.S. military must reduce its reliance on space enablers. In a conflict with the United States, the Chinese will execute their "anti-access/area denial" campaign and potentially deny U.S. forces access to space enabling capabilities such as GPS navigation, satellite communications and imagery intelligence. Per Dean Cheng, the U.S. military must train in a "degraded information environment" in order to be prepared for such a contingency. The military may have to resort to "antiquated" practices, such as navigating with a map and compass, in order to accomplish its mission in a war without the availability of space assets.
Also, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the development of air assets that can replicate space capabilities will serve to further the reduction of reliance on space.
Conclusion
China is pursuing a space control capability to deny enemy use of space assets while protecting Chinese space capabilities. The PLA has developed a formidable counter space capability that includes direct-ascent, laser, particle beam, and microwave weapons. There is no question that China has the capability now to destroy or hinder some U.S. satellite operations, but do they have the intent to use them?
Beijing continues to advocate the peaceful use of space stating that their space weapons are for defensive purposes and would only be used in retaliatory strikes against an attacking enemy. In other words, they claim to have no intent to use space weapons unless attacked. The
issue here is what is the definition of being "attacked"? Would the Chinese wait for a U.S.
preemptive first strike before responding? That is doubtful. More likely, China will react to a non-kinetic action, corresponding to a Chinese "red-line" that they feel threatens their national security interests. Due to the lack of transparency of Beijing's military intent, a Chinese "red- 
